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abstract
In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that 
this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive 
view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject 
and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of 
subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account 
of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities 
(qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology.
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What is the nature of colors? Are they properties of mind-independent objects, as common 
sense leads us to believe? Alternatively, are they merely subjective appearances, “internal” to 
a perceiver’s mind? These questions regard the specific case of color in a more general inquiry 
concerning the epistemological and ontological status of the sensory qualities that appear in 
perception (colors, sounds, smells, etc.). This inquiry is motivated by the reflection on some 
features of ordinary experience, which give rise to the so-called “problem of perception” (see 
Crane, 2015): perceptual relativity, illusion and hallucination. 
For example, consider the perception of a lemon. One can be aware that the color of the lemon 
appears differently when moving around it, or in relation to changes in the environmental 
light. One could also be aware of having had an illusory perception or even a hallucination 
of the lemon, perhaps caused by the ingestion of a psychedelic drug. These phenomena lead 
us to question the relationship between perceptual appearance and an “external”, mind-
independent reality beyond it.
The two main options concerning the epistemological and ontological status of sensory 
qualities are internalism and externalism. In the case of color, these options become color 
subjectivism and color objectivism. In the following, I shall discuss these views, in order to allow 
the enactive theory to emerge as an alternative to both.
The externalism of sensory qualities (qualia externalism) claims that, notwithstanding the 
problem of perception, in veridical perception we are acquainted with mind-independent 
objects, whose intrinsic properties are exactly what they appear to be in perceptual 
experience. This view – direct or naïve realism – is the philosophical account of perception that 
is more faithful to the common sense of the man in the street, who believes that “yellow” 
is a property of ripe lemons and not something “in the mind”. In the case of color, qualia 
externalism becomes color objectivism. According to it, colors are objective properties of things 
in the environment. 
A motivation for color objectivism is color constancy: the fact that even if perceptual 
appearances continuously change, we usually believe that a certain region of an object has 
a certain color (for e.g. a precise shade of yellow in the surface of the lemon, which remains 
constant over time and across different viewing conditions). Therefore, according to color 
objectivism colors are monadic properties of objects, which do not depend on a relation with a 
perceiver.
There are two versions of color objectivism: physicalism and primitivism.
1. Epistemology 
and ontology of 
color
1.1 Qualia 
externalism and 
color objectivism
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Color physicalism claims that colors are objective properties of material bodies and light 
sources. According to this view, we can discover the true nature of colors through scientific 
investigation, thus establishing an identity between colors and certain physical properties. 
This identity theory of color is analogous to the identity theory between mental states and 
physical states in the philosophy of mind. In particular, concerning physical surfaces, colors 
are conceived of as identical with their reflectance profile, i.e. the capacity to differentially 
reflect wavelengths from different regions of the incident illumination. However, each color 
turns out to be associated with many reflectance profiles. In order to account for the problem 
of “multiple realization” of colors (analogous to the same problem in the philosophy of mind), 
some authors argue for a version of color physicalism that claims an identity between colors 
and types of reflectance profiles (type-identity).
The other form of color objectivism is color primitivism. This view denies that there is a 
relation of identity between colors and physical properties such as reflectance profiles. On the 
contrary, it argues that colors are new, sui generis properties of material objects. This view is 
analogous to non-reductive theories in the philosophy of mind, such as Chalmers’ naturalistic 
dualism of properties (Chalmers, 1996), which claims that phenomenal properties are new 
properties of physical systems (strong emergence or natural supervenience).
Color objectivism comes across an obstacle when accounting for perceptual relativity, illusion, 
and hallucination. All these phenomena seem to point to a distinction between the way things 
appear in perception and what they “really” are. A classic option for facing the problem of 
perception consists in giving up the naïve realism of the man in the street, by distinguishing 
between qualitative properties such as colors, sounds, smells – conceived of as merely 
subjective appearances in the mind – and physical-mathematical properties such as shape, 
mass, energy, etc. – conceived of as objective properties of mind-independent objects. This is 
the view that was first developed in ancient atomism and that was later adopted by modern 
philosophers such as Galilei, Descartes and Locke, among others. This internalism concerning 
sensory qualities (qualia internalism), conceives of them as sensations that are merely “in the 
mind” and that are caused by objective processes in the physical world.
In the case of color, qualia internalism becomes color subjectivism. In particular, the received 
view in the philosophy of color is color dispositionalism. According to it, “objective colors” are 
dispositions to cause certain effects (“phenomenal colors”, i.e. color sensations) in the visual 
system of a perceiver in certain conditions (for e.g., the objective “red” is the disposition, 
defined in physical terms, to cause sensations of red in a perceiver’s mind). According to color 
subjectivism, colors are not monadic but relational, since they involve a relation between 
perceivers, objects and circumstances.1
Color subjectivism is developed as an answer to the problem of perception. In particular, 
it accounts for different forms of perceptual relativity: intrapersonal, interpersonal and 
interspecies.
For example, I can become aware that a single region of the lemon that is in front of me appears 
differently in different conditions, for e.g. under different environmental lights, or in relation to 
changes in my physiological conditions (e.g. after ingesting santonin, which makes everything 
to look yellowish; see Husserl, 1989, pp. 62 ff.). These are forms of intrapersonal relativity.
1  Color subjectivism presupposes that perceivers, objects and circumstances can be defined independently from the 
relation in which they enter into perception. I shall later present the enactive view as a stronger form of relationism, 
which denies the independent existence of subjective and objective poles of perceptual relation.
1.2 Qualia 
internalism and 
color subjectivism
1.3 Perceptual 
relativity 
and color 
relationalism
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Various experiments point to forms of interpersonal variation in color vision. In relation to the 
same object and the same circumstances, the experiments show that different perceivers 
might have different color experiences. This is argued by referring to the concept of color 
space: the structure of the appearance of colors in the dimensions of hue, saturation and 
brightness. In fact, we can express phenomenal judgments that refer to the structural features 
of our experience of colors. In particular, we can distinguish between unique hues, which 
do not contain other chromatic components (in specific shades of blue, yellow, green and 
red) and binary hues (for e.g. orange, which contains both yellow and red). The point is that 
in an experimental setting, different perceivers, that are presented with a certain range of 
stimuli, might pick up different ones when asked to point out unique hues. For e.g., whereas 
one person recognizes a “unique green”, another person might recognize a “bluish green” 
(see Cohen, 2004, p. 464).  The difference in the phenomenal judgments of different people 
in front of the same objects in the same circumstances, shows that they have different color 
experiences.2 This claim leads us to the central thesis of color subjectivism: “phenomenal 
colors” are not objective properties of material objects; they are subjective sensations that 
arise in a subject’s experience as a consequence of certain events in the physical world (i.e., 
the world that is described by mathematical physics). 
The classic version of color dispositionalism defines the “objective” color (e.g. red19) as the 
disposition to cause certain sensations to normal observers in normal circumstances. A different 
version of color dispositionalism is J. Cohen’s color relationalism (Cohen, 2009). Cohen highlights 
the fact that the definition of what counts as a normal observer in normal circumstances is 
somewhat arbitrary. For this reason, he develops a stronger form of relationalism regarding 
color. By considering the different forms of relativity in color vision (intrapersonal, 
interpersonal and interspecies), Cohen argues that there is no independent and well-
motivated reason to pick one of the variants as the veridical perception of a certain color. For 
this reason, we must reconcile the apparently incompatible variants by relativizing colors to 
different values of certain parameters (Cohen, 2004, p. 454). 
For e.g., consider the phenomenon of color induction: two grey squares with the same 
reflectance profile turn out to appear differently when placed against different backgrounds: 
darker when placed against a light background, lighter when placed against a dark background 
(see Cohen, 2004, pp. 455, 505). Which is the “normal circumstance” and therefore the true 
judgement concerning the perceptual appearance of the square? Is the perceived color of 
the square light grey or dark grey? Cohen’s proposal is to consider both judgements as true, 
conceiving of colors as relational properties that vary in relation to background configurations 
and to various other factors (viewing conditions, physiological conditions of the perceiver, 
etc.). According to Cohen’s color relationalism, “colors are not monadic properties like red or 
green, but rather relational properties like red for S1 in C1, or green for S2 in C2” (Cohen, 2012, p. 
293).
Cohen’s relationalism is still a form of color subjectivism. In fact, it is based on the distinction 
between “experiences of red/green/etc.” (Cohen, 2012, p. 293), which are “type of mental 
states of subjects” (Cohen, 2012, p.  293) and the physical causes of these experiences: visual 
systems, objects, circumstances.3
2  This conclusion must leave aside the possible doubt concerning the presence of any phenomenal experience in 
another person. In the words of Chalmers (1996), the other person could be a “phenomenal zombie”.
3  For this reason, this view leaves open the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995), i.e. the 
difficulty found in explaining how and why certain physical processes give rise to  our “colourful” experience.
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So far, we have seen the two main options in the philosophy of color: subjectivism (classic 
dispositionalism or Cohen’s relationalism) and objectivism (physicalism or primitivism). 
In turn, these views constitute the application to the case of color of two more general 
strategies concerning the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities: qualia 
internalism and qualia externalism. These views are opposed to each other and they each 
play on the difficulties of the other. Qualia internalism tries to account for the problem 
of perception (relativity, illusion, hallucination), but it enters into conflict with the naïve 
realism of common sense. Qualia externalism is more faithful to common sense, but has 
difficulties in accounting for perceptual relativity, illusions and hallucinations. However, 
internalism and externalism have something in common: they are both based on the duality 
of subject and object, conceived of as independent and pre-constituted poles of the cognitive 
relation. In particular, in both views, the “external” world is conceived of as an ontological 
domain that is mind-independent and that is known, directly or indirectly, in perception. 
According to externalism/objectivism, the external world is faithfully described by common 
sense. According to internalism/subjectivism, it is described by mathematical physics. In the 
following, I shall argue that the enactive view of color challenges the common presuppositions 
of both internalism/subjectivism and externalism/objectivism, deconstructing the clear 
duality of subject and object that they both presuppose.
The investigation of color vision has a central role in the development of the enactive 
approach, being conceived of as “a case study in the foundations of cognitive science” 
(Varela & Thompson, 1990). From this analysis, the proponents of the enactive view draw 
some radical consequences concerning the nature of cognition in general. F. Varela and E. 
Thompson (Varela & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1992) develop their enactive theory 
of color in the context of a new paradigm for the cognitive sciences, which is especially 
developed in The Embodied Mind (Varela et al., 1991). At the base of this framework there is 
a comparative argument, which is based on the analysis of the interspecies variation in color 
vision. The comparative argument starts by distinguishing the color space (the structure of 
the appearance of colors, constituted by the dimensions of hue, saturation and brightness, as 
we have seen) from the chromatic domain, which is the physiological basis of color vision and 
is relative to the embodiment of a perceiver. In human beings, the chromatic domain can be 
represented in a mathematical space with three independent variables, which result from 
the combination of the sensitivity curves of the photopigments in the retinal cones, giving us 
a trichromatic domain. The comparative argument unfolds in two steps. Firstly, it establishes 
a correspondence between the structure of the chromatic domain and the structure of the 
color space. Secondly, it claims that “since chromatic domains are relative to the embodiment 
in a given perceiver class, so too is color space.” (Varela & Thompson, 1990: 134). In fact, the 
physiological basis of color vision varies amongst different classes of animals, which range 
from dichromats to even pentachromats (in certain diurnal birds like pigeons and ducks). By 
detecting these physiological differences, we can infer radical differences in the respective 
experience of colors. An important point is that there is a radical incommensurability between 
color spaces with different dimensions. We cannot imagine of a tetrachromat perceiver as one 
that can make finer distinction between, for e.g. red and yellow hues, because this would only 
be an increase in resolution within our own chromatic domain. On the contrary, the difference 
between trichromatic and tetrachromatic vision consists in the fact that there is a completely 
new dimension in the color space. Therefore, we cannot map one color space into the other 
(see Varela & Thompson, 1990, p. 135).
The consequence of the comparative argument is that different animals have a different 
experience of colors. For example, a tetrachromat perceiver can see a difference between 
certain items, whereas we see a perceptual match. They can see qualitative discontinuities, 
2. The enactive 
theory of color
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whereas we see a homogeneously colored region of space. For this reason, these animals 
perceive “novel hues” within “color hyperspaces” with four or five dimensions.4
At this point, in order to appreciate the specificity of the enactive account of color, we must 
compare it with color subjectivism and color objectivism.
The comparative argument could seem to imply a form of color subjectivism, which conceives 
of colors as subjective sensations that vary between different classes of animals. However, 
the enactive account of color is explicitly developed as an alternative to color subjectivism, 
criticizing “the‘internalist’ view that perceptual content is provided by subjective qualities 
(qualia)” (Thompson et al., 1992, p. 401). The internalist view is based on the distinction 
between “primary properties” of objects, investigated by mathematical physics and secondary 
properties, which are merely subjective appearances. In contrast with this distinction, the 
proponents of the enactive approach argue for the interdependency between color vision and 
spatial segmentation (Thompson et al., 1992, p. 402).5 In fact, the segmentation of a visual scene, 
which allows one to detect different surfaces and objects, presupposes the ability to perceive 
qualitative discontinuities, i.e. chromatic differences. We can visually perceive an object with 
a certain shape, that emerges as a salient object of perception, by perceiving its boundaries, 
which differentiate it from the background and from other objects and we perceive these 
boundaries by detecting chromatic differences. Therefore, spatial properties such as shapes 
and boundaries cannot be conceived of as objective properties of a pre-constituted, mind-
independent world, since they depend on the perception of colors. This perception, in turn, is 
relative to the embodiment of a perceiver. According to the enactive view, both “primary” and 
“secondary” properties must be conceived within a process of co-emergence of perceiver and 
environment in reciprocal dependence. 
The latter thesis is explicitly stated in the framework of The Embodied Mind: “Knower and 
known, mind and world, stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or 
dependent coorigination.” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 150). As we will see below, this thesis implies 
a deconstruction of the clear duality of subject and object, in order to investigate their co-
emergence in the process of experience.
The enactive view of color is also different from color objectivism. In order to highlight 
this difference we can compare the enactive approach with J. Gibson’s ecological theory 
of perception. In fact, there are significant affinities but also differences between these 
views. Varela and Thompson agree with Gibson’s “deep insight that perception must be 
understood within the ecological context of guided activity” (Thompson et al., 1992, p. 399) 
and his account of perception in terms of sensorimotor coupling between organism and 
environment. Furthermore, the notion of affordance, which is central to Gibson’s view, involves 
a complementarity of animal and environment and, for this reason, is relational. Affordances 
are properties of objects in the environment that appear to a certain animal in virtue of its 
sensorimotor capacities (for e.g. a handle affords holding for an animal that can hold it, a 
chair affords sitting for an animal that can seat on it, etc.).  However, the relational notion of 
affordance goes together, in Gibson, with a form of direct or naïve realism (see Gibson, 1967, 
p. 168). According to Gibson, perception consists in the direct picking up of information that is 
4  See Thompson et al., (1992) for the mathematical details of the kind of incommensurability that we must admit 
between different color spaces. The consequence of this incommensurability is that we cannot have any idea of the 
different hues that are perceived, for e.g., by a pigeon or a duck (Thompson et al., 1992, p. 377).
5  These authors refer to Berkeley’s critique to the distinction between primary and secondary properties (see 
Thompson et al., 1992, p. 387 n. 13).
2.1 Not 
subjectivism
2.2 Not 
objectivism
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enclosed in the environment, without involving any sensation or sense datum (Gibson, 1972, 
p. 77). However, on this point Thompson et al. (1992, p. 399)  criticize “Gibson’s belief that the 
only alternative to the mistaken sense-data view of perception is direct realism”. In contrast 
to Gibson’s direct realism, these authors consider the environment that is inhabited and 
perceived by an animal, not as a pre-given ontological domain, endowed with certain objective 
properties and directly grasped in perceptual activity, but also as “something determined by 
that very activity” (Thompson et al., 1992, p. 399).
The latter passage could be interpreted as just referring to the fact, which is crucial for 
the enactive view, that an animal’s activity modifies the environment and, in turn, the 
environment modifies the animal’s behaviour. Concerning color vision, Varela and Thompson 
stress its ecological dimension by referring to examples that point to a co-determination and 
co-selection of sensory-motor capacities of animals and environmental features. For example, 
the trichromatic color vision of bees, which is shifted towards the ultra-violet, seems to have 
been “co-evolved with the colors of flowers, which often have contrasting patterns in the 
ultraviolet light” (Thompson et al., 1992, p. 392). This thesis could be read as still presupposing 
an objectivist view of the environment, conceived of as an ontological domain that is pre-
constituted and independent from the cognitive relation. However, as we will see below, the 
enactive view is more radically relationist, since it conceives of the enactive relation between 
perceiver and environment as a “dependent co-origination”, which does not presuppose the 
independent and substantial existence of the two poles of cognition.
For this reason, the original formulation of the enactive approach must be distinguished 
from some other strands of “enactivism” in the contemporary debate that are more near to 
Gibson’s direct realism.6 In particular, the so-called “sensorimotor enactivism” of K. O’Regan 
and A. Noë (O’Regan & Noë, 2001; Noë & O’Regan, 2002) takes from the enactive approach 
the understanding of cognition in terms of sensorimotor activities. For these authors, 
seeing is an exploratory activity of the animal that is mediated by its mastery of rules of 
interdependence between stimulation and movement (Noë & O’Regan, 2002, p. 568). By 
being “attuned” to the structure of sensorimotor contingencies, the animal is “perceptually 
coupled with its environment” (Noë & O’Regan, 2002, p. 569). However, the notion of 
environment that comes into play in the sensorimotor approach seems to refer to an 
objective pole of the cognitive relation that is pre-constituted and directly perceived. When 
raising the issue of the ontological status of “qualia” and, specifically, the ontological status 
of colors, these authors express an objectivist/externalist position: “when you see a red 
wall there are just the different things you do when you interact with the redness of the wall” 
(Noë & O’Regan, 2002, p. 572, emphasis added). In this view, red turns out to be an objective 
property of the environment that is directly perceived: “you have access to the redness 
by the most minute of eye movements or attentional shifts. The redness is there, in the 
environment. The slightest eye, head, or attention movement reveals further information 
about its character […] you have continuous access to the redness in the environment.” (Noë 
& O’Regan, 2002, p. 580).
On the contrary, the enactive view argues for a stronger correlation between perceptual 
contents and ecological properties: “the contents of perceptual states are to be type-identified 
by way of the ecological properties perceived, and these ecological properties are to be type-
identified by way of the states that perceive them” (Thompson et al., 1992, p. 401). On this 
point, one could object that this definition of ecological properties and perceptual states is 
6  See Vörös et al. (2016) for the differences between the non-metaphysical framework of The Embodied Mind and some 
subsequent forms of “enactivism” that are characterized by a “shift towards realism” (Vörös et al., 2016, p. 194).
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circular. However, the enactivist answer is that it is exactly this fundamental circularity that is 
expressed in the concept of enaction.
The enactive view of color is at the basis of a general framework that constitutes a new 
paradigm for the cognitive science. This framework is centred on the rethinking of the 
relationship between subject and object. In the enactive view, subject and object are not pre-
constituted, substantial domains that somehow enter into cognitive relation. On the contrary, 
they are conceived of as co-emergent or co-dependently arising in the process of experience. 
The concept of co-dependent arising is taken from the Madhyamaka (Middle Way), which is 
one of the classic schools of Buddhist philosophy (see Varela et al., 1991, p. 221 ff.). Nagarjuna 
– the founder of this school of thought – developed a radically relationist view that denies 
the substantial and independent reality of subject and object. Nagarjuna argues that in our 
experience we cannot find anything that is substantial and not dependent on something else. 
Every moment of experience is related to something other than itself and every object of 
cognition is related to mental processes. For this reason, neither of the poles of cognition can be 
conceived of as independent from the other. Subjects and objects are non-substantial poles of a 
process of dependent co-origination. In the words of M. Bitbol, in Nagarjuna’s view “The duality 
of subject and object, of perceiving and perceived, is not denied; but it is shown to be empty, 
namely to arise from a symmetric relation of mutual dependence.” (Bitbol, 2003, p. 339). Bitbol 
likens the relationism of the Middle Way to Kant’s philosophy, that also conceives of subject 
and object not as pre-given substances but as functional poles of a correlation. In Kant’s view, 
the object of knowledge is not independent from the cognitive relation, being the correlate of 
a process of constitution in  which the subject itself comes to be constituted (see esp. Kant, 1781-
87/1998, A158/B197). In both Kant’s philosophy and the Middle Way, the two relata of cognition 
do not pre-exist as independent domains but co-arise in the process of experience.7 This form of 
relationism constitutes the theoretical core of the enactive approach in its original version.
At this point, I would like to show that enactive relationism converges with some central 
aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology. I shall do so by considering, firstly, Husserl’s theory of 
perception, with special reference to color vision.
The phenomenological analysis of perception is centred on the concepts of intentional form and 
sensory matter. The act of perceiving consists in the intentional animation (morphè) of sensory 
matters (hyle), through which the object of perception is constituted. This analysis of perception 
in terms of constitution is aimed at accounting for two aspects of perception, which we have 
already seen in regard to color vision: perceptual relativity and perceptual constancy. For e.g., 
the lemon appears to me as endowed with certain constant properties, such as shape and color 
(e.g. a specific shade of yellow in a certain region of its surface). However, I perceive these 
objectual properties through a continuous flow of experiences that constantly changes. For 
e.g., the yellowness of the lemon appears through a continuous multiplicity of adumbrations 
of yellow. For this reason, Husserl distinguishes between color as objectual property (the 
yellowness of the lemon) and color as sensation, which is a component of consciousness:
The color of the seen physical thing is, of essential necessity, not a really inherent 
moment of the consciousness of color; it appears, but while it is appearing the 
7  Bitbol refers to the development of Kantian philosophy in the Marburg school and especially to Cassirer, who 
“recommended that one not construe subject and object as a pair of ontologically closed entities” and stated “after 
Cohen, the idea of a ‘reciprocal co-belonging’ of the concepts of subject and object’.” (Bitbol, 2003, p. 340).
2.3 Enaction 
as dependent 
co-origination
3. Enactive 
phenomenology 
and ontology
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appearance can and must, in the case of a legitimating experience, be continually 
changing. The same color appears ‘in’ continuous multiplicities of color adumbrations 
(Husserl, 1983, p. 74).
It must be borne clearly in mind that the Data of sensation which exercise the function 
of adumbrations of color, of smoothness, of shape, etc. (the function of ‘presentation’) 
are, of essential necessity, entirely different from color simpliciter, smoothness 
simpliciter, shape simpliciter, and, in short, from all kinds of moments belonging 
to physical things. The adumbration, though called by the same name, of essential 
necessity is not of the same genus as the one to which the adumbrated belongs (Husserl, 
1983, p. 75).
This analysis of perception is centered on the distinction, and correlation, between sensations 
(which are immanent, i.e. “internal”) and sensory properties (which are transcendent, i.e. 
“external”). In this way, this account constitutes an alternative to the two opposite views 
that we have already seen in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of perception: qualia 
internalism and qualia externalism. As a criticism of qualia internalism, Husserl criticizes 
the hypostatization of the “physical thing”, i.e. the object of mathematical physics, which 
conceives of it as an absolute reality “in itself” that would be the “real” cause of subjective 
appearances (metaphysical realism). In the phenomenological view, the so-called primary 
properties are the result of a theoretical abstraction from the concrete phenomenon that 
is constituted as the correlate of intentional acts (see esp. Husserl, 1970, pp. 30 ff.). The 
phenomenological account of perception as constitution through the intentional animation of 
hyletic contents is also different from qualia externalism (and direct realism, such as Gibson’s), 
because of its denial of the role of sensations in perception and its idea of the object as a mind-
independent and pre-constituted reality (see Gibson, 1967, p. 67).8
Concerning the epistemology and ontology of color, the phenomenological account of 
perception is an alternative to both color subjectivism and color objectivism, since it admits 
both color as sensation (e.g. the adumbration of yellow) and color as objectual property (e.g. 
the yellowness of the lemon). However, one could object that this account, which does not 
overlap with neither internalism nor externalism, also implies a problematic duplication of 
properties. In particular, according to K. Mulligan (1995, p. 47) Husserl’s claim that between 
sensations and sensory properties there is a relation of “similarity” remains “obscure” 
(Mulligan 1995, p. 47).9 In my opinion, in order to shed light on this difficulty we must take into 
account the distinction between two levels of the phenomenological inquiry: static and genetic.
Static phenomenology conceives of the experiences as “unitary temporal processes” (Husserl, 
1983, p. 171) and investigates their correlation with objects. As we have seen, this correlation 
in conceived of in terms of the intentional animation of sensory contents. However, when 
developing this analysis, Husserl also states that it must be considered as preliminary to a 
genetic “deepening”.10
8  See Zhok (2013) for a comparison between Gibson’s direct realism and Husserl’s phenomenology. Zhok stresses 
affinities but also important differences between them concerning the ontological status of percepts.
9  Mulligan also claims that Husserl “remained attached to the thesis without ever explaining just what it is supposed 
to involve.” (Mulligan, 1995, p. 47).
10  The explicit distinction between the two levels of the phenomenological inquiry, static and genetic, was at the 
heart of Husserl’s philosophy after publishing Ideas I. However, this distinction was implicitly present also before, 
especially in the lectures on time-consciousness (Husserl 1991; see also Husserl 1999) and in some passages of Ideas I 
(see Husserl, 1983, p. 171).
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Genetic phenomenology investigates the temporal micro-structure of experiences. In the 
light of this inquiry, experiences turn out to be constituted by a continuous flow of primal 
impressions (Urimpressionen) that are interlaced with two forms of proto-intentionality: 
retention and protention.11 In this way, genetic phenomenology investigates the “genesis 
of constitution” (Husserl, 2001, p. 644), i.e. the micro-genesis of the process through which 
experiences come to constitute objects. 
An important implication of the genetic broadening of phenomenology is that it reveals 
the genesis of both subject and object of experience, i.e. their co-constitution in reciprocal 
dependence. In fact, the process through which an object is constituted as the correlate of 
perceptual experiences is at the same time the process through which the subject itself comes 
to be constituted as a subjective pole of cognition. The process of perceiving consists in the 
intentional “animation”, through retentions and protentions, of primal impressions. From 
the static point of view, these impressions constitute the phenomenal contents of perceptual 
“states”, which ground the constitution of perceptual “objects”. However, the genetic inquiry 
deconstructs this static duality of “states” and “objects”, revealing a process of co-emergence 
of experiences and objects in reciprocal dependence. At the basis of this process, there is a 
primary qualitative process: the flow of primal impressions in inner time-consciousness and 
their proto-intentional animation through retentions and protentions.
The process-oriented and relationist account of experience in genetic phenomenology 
converges with the enactivist notion of cognition as dependent co-origination of subject 
and object. It also converges with the enactive approach in revealing the essentially 
embodied character of consciousness, acknowledging the essential role of bodily features in 
shaping the experience of a perceiver.12 This closeness between the original version of the 
enactive approach and Husserl’s phenomenology is particularly evident in Varela’s project 
of neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996), which is continuous with the enactive framework. In 
fact, Varela argues that the phenomenological inquiry “does not sustain the basic subject-
object duality but opens into a field of phenomena where it becomes less and less obvious 
how to distinguish between subject and object (this is what Husserl called the ‘fundamental 
correlation’.” (Varela, 1996, p. 339).13
The combination of the enactive approach and phenomenology leads us to define the fields of 
enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology, which investigate the constitution of objects in 
terms of the correlation and co-emergence of subject and object in reciprocal dependence.14 
This approach can investigate the constitution of different domains of empirical reality, or 
regional ontologies, by accounting for their emergence from a primal process of co-constitution 
of subject and object in reciprocal dependence.
Concerning the epistemology and ontology of color, enactive phenomenology and ontology 
gives support to color relationism, i.e. the thesis that colors are relational properties in a strong 
sense. According to this view, the experience of color is to be found in the process of co-
emergence of the perceiver and the perceived. When asked the questions “where is the color?” 
11  Here I must leave aside the details of Husserl’s analysis of inner time-consciousness, in order to focus on some of 
its central aspects.
12  See especially the analyses developed by Husserl in Ideas II (Husserl, 1989) and further developed by Merleau-
Ponty (2005).
13  C. Petitmengin (2017: 146) stresses the continuity between Husserl’s genetic phenomenology and Varela’s 
neurophenomenology, arguing that they both investigate the “process of co-constitution” (ibid: 142) of the “objective 
and subjective poles […] within lived experience” (ibid: 141). On the relationship between Husserl’s phenomenology 
and Varela’s neurophenomenology see also (Bitbol, 2008, 2012; Pace Giannotta, 2017).
14  I pointed out some lines of development of an enactive ontology in (Pace Giannotta, 2016).
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and “is it internal or external?” the relationist answer is that there is not a monadic property 
such as “phenomenal property” or “quale” (for qualia internalism and color subjectivism), 
or objectual property (for qualia externalism and color objectivism). The experience of color 
emerges from the process of dependent co-origination of the perceiver and the perceived.
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